Winners and Losers in the Panel Stage of the WTO Dispute Settlement System by Hoekman, Bernard et al.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2008 
Winners and Losers in the Panel Stage of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System 
Bernard Hoekman 
European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), 
bernard.hoekman@eui.eu 
Henrik Horn 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), henrik.horn@ifn.se 
Petros C. Mavroidis 
Columbia Law School, petros.mavroidis@unine.ch 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bernard Hoekman, Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis, Winners and Losers in the Panel Stage of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM, CHANTAL THOMAS & JOEL 
TRACHTMAN, EDS., OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2009; RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS IFN WORKING 
PAPER NO. 769 (2008). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2389 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For 
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1410618
 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics 
P.O. Box 55665 

















IFN Working Paper No. 769, 2008 
 
 
Winners and Losers in the Panel Stage of the 
WTO Dispute Settlement System  
Bernard Hoekman, Henrik Horn and 
Petros C. Mavroidis 
 
 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1410618















Petros C. Mavroidis 
Columbia Law School, New York 
University of Neuchâtel  
CEPR, London 
 
This version: July 2008 
 
Abstract 
A significant body of research has sought to examine claims that developing countries are under-
represented as complainants, and/or over-represented as respondents in the WTO dispute 
settlement system. Most of this literature has focused on their propensity to participate, the idea 
being that under-representation as complainants or over representation as respondents would 
suggest a bias in the system. This paper provides some descriptive statistics that could shed light on 
a different manifestation of a “bias” against developing countries. It employs a dataset containing 
information on the legal claims made in each WTO dispute between 1995 and 2006, as well as a 
rough classification as to whether each specific claim was accepted or not by the respective panel. 
The data is used to compare the extent to propensity by which G2 countries, other industrialized 
countries, and developing countries have won the claims that they have made before panels. 
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1. Introduction 
Most research on the role of developing countries in the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Dispute Settlement (DS) system has focused on their propensity to participate as complainants, 
respondents and third parties. Much of this line of research has sought to examine claims that 
developing countries are under-represented as complainants, and/or over-represented as 
respondents in the DS system. Several reasons have been suggested why such biases are likely. 
For instance, developing countries may lack economic/legal capacity to defend their rights; or, 
“power” considerations might play a role (fear of issue linkage). Alternatively, market size 
considerations may play a role, with the limited scope for credibly threatening retaliation acting 
as a disincentive to bring cases.1 The research along these lines has looked for circumstantial 
evidence in terms of biased participation or operation of the DS system. 
If the above-type of allegations are well founded, it can be argued that reduced 
participation does not capture the full damage done to developing countries. The same factors that 
deter developing country from participating as complainants in the first place may also cause 
disadvantages in those cases where developing countries do participate. For instance, lack of legal 
resources may adversely affect the quality of the legal argumentation by developing countries. 
Very little systematic evidence exists beyond the pioneering work of Hudec (1993) – at least as 
far as we are aware – on whether developing countries, when they actually do participate in the 
DS system, fare better or worse than richer countries.  The purpose of this paper is to take a first 
small step in enhancing our knowledge on this subject by examining whether the outcomes with 
regard to legal claims differ between developing and developed countries.  
This paper employs a data set describing various aspects of the DS system that have been 
compiled under a World Bank project (hereinafter, the “dataset”) to take a first cut at exploring 
what the experience to date suggests regarding this question.2 The objective underpinning the 
assembly of the data set was to systematically compile information on various aspects of the DS 
system, in order, inter alia, to facilitate assessment of its implications for developing countries. 
The dataset contains a large number of variables that reflect various aspects of developing 
country participation in disputes, as well as the procedural aspects of disputes. The most recent 
                                                 
1 There is also research arguing that there are good reasons why one would expect to see developing countries under-
represented as respondents in the DS system, reflecting the fact that the small size of markets acts as a disincentive 
for trading partners to bring cases—the expected “rate of return” is too low. 
2 The dataset can be freely accessed and downloaded at www.worldbank.org/trade/wtodisputes. 
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version covers all 351 WTO disputes initiated through the official filing of a Request for 
Consultations at the WTO, from January 1, 1995 until December 31, 2006. For these disputes, the 
dataset covers exhaustively all stages of dispute settlement proceedings, from the moment when 
consultations are requested to the eventual implementation of the panel/Appellate Body (AB) 
rulings (or, if not yet finalized, the last stage of the DS process that has been officially reported). 
The dataset contains several hundred variables, providing information on various aspects of the 
legal procedure. Horn and Mavroidis (2008a) describe the structure of the dataset, and Horn and 
Mavroidis (2008b) provide some descriptive statistics employing the data. 
The dataset contains information on the legal claims made in each dispute, as well as a 
rough classification as to whether each specific claim was accepted or not by the panel/AB. In 
this paper we use these data to examine whether there are any systematic differences between 
developing and developed countries in terms of the outcomes of cases at the panel stage. The 
approach we take to classify outcomes is straightforward: we simply count the share of claims 
made by complainants in each case that was upheld by the panel. While this tells us nothing about 
the relative economic importance of different claims to the complainants, it does allow us to 
explore whether there are substantial differences across country groups in terms of one objective 
measure of the outcomes of DS cases, and this is what we are interested in. More generally, an 
analysis of number of claims made by countries is of interest in its own right – to our knowledge 
this has not been the subject of analysis to date in the literature. 
A problem with our unit of account in assessing outcomes is that some measures (and thus 
some claims) will be more important than others to the claimants. Our approach does not provide 
any insight into this very important practical dimension of dispute cases. However, it is very 
difficult if not impossible for researchers to determine from the data on a DS case what “really 
mattered” and what did not. Indeed, in some situations being found to have violated a WTO 
agreement or commitment may actually be the preferred outcome for a respondent: e.g., if a 
government sees this as helpful in pursuing a policy reform that is opposed by a powerful 
domestic constituency.  For instance, it has been suggested to us that the Chilean alcoholic 
beverage dispute is a case in point. What should be meant by “winning” such a dispute, and how 
should the analyst be able to correctly classify the outcome? 
This problem also affects the approach taken by Hudec (1993), who focused on whether 
respondents comply. Hudec argued that the appropriate measure of the outcome of a DS case is 
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the policy result of a dispute, that is, whether the case lead to the implementation of policy 
changes by the ‘losing’ party. While this has the advantage of being an objective measure that is 
comparable across cases, it is not necessarily a good measure of the outcome of a dispute. Indeed, 
there is no obvious “appropriate” measure of outcomes of DS cases. Even if the variable of 
interest is held to be implementation, this can occur on either substantive or procedural grounds. 
For example, if a complainant loses on all substantive claims but nonetheless wins the case on the 
grounds of lack of notification, the respondent will be requested to notify. But this is unlikely to 
make much of a difference in practice, even if the respondent would comply to 100%. More 
generally, as already mentioned, “losers” may actually perceive that they have won, e.g., if this 
helps the government concerned pursue policies that it thinks are beneficial but were impeded by 
domestic political economy constraints. Or, the objective may simply have been to raise the 
political profile of a policy matter, perhaps as part of a strategy to place the subject on the agenda 
of a negotiating round. Although obviously important, implementation as the benchmark is not 
necessarily the most appropriate indicator of outcomes given the absence of information 
regarding the “true” underlying objectives of the parties to a dispute. While our focus in this 
paper is narrower than the one advocated by Hudec, it is arguably a useful complement to the 
approach he pioneered. The number of claims can be readily observed and measured – there is no 
need for subjective assessments or interpretation by observers: the number of claims made in a 
dispute is simply a datum.  
The analysis in the paper is limited to an initial exploration of the data with a view to 
identifying more precise hypotheses for future research, both qualitative and quantitative, that can 
be pursued using the database. The data on number of claims made by different groups of 
countries across different types of policy areas/WTO disciplines throw up many questions 
regarding the determinants of the expected payoffs of alternative legal strategies and the observed 
behavior of WTO Members – including whether to bring a dispute, whether to participate in one 
as a co-complainant, the importance of the identity of co-complainants, the number of claims to 
bring – and the factors that affect the rulings of WTO panels/AB (e.g., nationality of panelists, 
role of legal representation and legal precedent). 
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2. The data 
The focus of our analysis is on bilateral disputes, where the term bilateral refers to a dyad of 
WTO Members (complainant, defendant). A bilateral dispute might contain more than one legal 
claim. Multiple complaints (for instance, DS27, EC – Bananas III, where four WTO Members 
challenged the consistency of EC practices), are disaggregated into a number of bilateral disputes 
equal to the number of complainants involved.3  The “unit of account” that is the center of 
attention in the analysis are legal claims as defined in the WTO case law on Art. 6.2 DSU: a legal 
claim comprises a factual matter and the legal provision that it allegedly violates. 
 Our interest is in the outcomes of the cases. The universe of outcomes that form our 
dataset comprises the findings of WTO adjudicating bodies as they appear in the Conclusions and 
Recommendations Section of each report. We classify outcomes into three groups: (1) claims 
where the complainant prevailed; (2) claims where the defendant prevailed; and (3) a residual 
group of claims where the outcome is unclear. While in principle a panel should either find for or 
against a claim by a complainant, practice has made inclusion of this third category a necessity. 
One reason is that claims may not be addressed by a panel as result of the exercise of judicial 
economy. Outcomes also may not correspond to specific claims initiated by the complainant: this 
is the case where a panel, for instance, reviews, on its own initiative, its competence to adjudicate 
a particular claim.4 Insofar as they are reported, we also map intermediate findings – those that 
might have a bearing on the final finding (that is, the finding on the claim as presented by the 
complainant), but which are distinct from final findings – into the third category.  
In this paper, WTO Members are classified into four groups: G2 – the European 
Community (EC) 5 and the United States (US); IND – 15 other industrialized countries, including 
three high-income WTO Members that are (self-)classified as developing in the WTO (Hong 
Kong, South Korea and Singapore), DEV – developing countries other than LDCs; and LDC – 
the group of least developed countries. The exact classification is described in Appendix 1. The 
LDC group comprises the countries that the United Nations has defined to be least developed. All 
                                                 
3 So far, there has never been a case before a WTO panel where more than one defendant has been involved. 
4 WTO adjudicating bodies have, according to standing case-law under Art. 6.2 DSU, the competence to unilaterally 
review their competence to adjudicate a dispute and are not, consequently, necessarily bound by the content of a 
request for establishment of a panel as submitted by the complainant. 
5 We follow the evolution of the EC membership, in the sense that up to January 1, 2004 EC is EC-15, after that date 
EC-25, and as of January 1, 2007, it is EC-27.  
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OECD countries are mapped to IND, as are all current EC members in the period before they 
acceded to the EC. The DEV group consists of all other countries. 
 
3. A broad characterization of the distribution of claims 
We use information on all bilateral disputes between 1995 and 2006 in which a panel was formed 
and issued a report, and in which at least one legal claim was made. There are in total 144 such 
bilateral disputes.6 
 
Table 1: Distribution of the number of bilateral disputes by group pairing 
 Respondent 
 G2 IND DEV TOT 
G2 20 22 13 55 
IND 35 5 7 47 







TOT 88 31 25 144 
 
 
3.1 The distribution of bilateral disputes across groups 
Table 1 provides a classification of these disputes across the various groups of complainants and 
respondents. As is often remarked, LDCs are completely absent, reflecting the fact the few 
instances where they have participated in the DS system, the cases have not gone beyond the 
consultations stage. The shares of the three groups as complainants in the bilateral disputes are 
fairly evenly distributed: G2 accounts for slightly more (55 cases or 38%) than IND (33%) and 
DEV (29%). The role of G2 as a respondent is much more highly concentrated: the EC or US are 
respondents in 88 of the disputes (61% of all cases), compared to 22% for IND and 17% for 
DEV. Noteworthy is that G2 countries are involved on one or the other side in 85% of the 
bilateral disputes in the dataset. Both IND and DEV mainly target G2 when acting as 
complainants – presumably reflecting the fact that these are the two largest markets in the world – 
while the G2 spread their complaints more evenly across each other and the two other groups. 
                                                 
6 The difference between the 351 formal disputes brought between 1996 and 2006 and the 144 that are the focus of 
this paper reflects cases that were settled, dropped or remain pending. The consultation process and more generally 
the role and effectiveness of the DS system in getting WTO members to settle cases “out of court” is an important 
and relatively neglected dimension of the WTO process. In this paper, as is true of most of the literature, the focus is 
on those cases that went to the panel stage.  See, e.g., Davey (2005) for a discussion of the effectiveness of 
consultations. 
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 It should be noted that although the DEV group encompasses 74 countries, only 18 have 
brought a case. Of these 18 countries, Brazil and India account for more than half of the total 
number of bilateral disputes brought by DEV (Appendix 6 and 7). 
 
3.2 The distribution of claims across groups 
As noted above, the unit of account used in this study is a “legal claim”. The 144 bilateral 
disputes in the dataset involved a total of 2,369 claims. A total of 301 different legal grounds are 
quoted according to the data set. The majority of cases have a limited number of claims – 
between 1 and 15 – but a few have over 80 (Figure 1). The mode is two claims. Table 2 provides 
a breakdown of these claims across the three groups of Members. A first striking feature is that 
the IND group accounts for 1089 of the 2,369 claims, or almost half (46%) of all the claims that 
have been made during the first 12 years the WTO DS system was operational. This contrasts 
with IND’s 33% share of the 144 bilateral disputes in the dataset. Thus, in this crude sense IND is 
over-represented (they include more claims per bilateral dispute than any other group). DEV 
accounts for 27% of all claims, which is closely in line with their 29% share of all bilateral 
disputes. Consequently, G2 is “under-represented”, accounting for only 27% of all claims, while 
acting as complainants in 38% of all bilateral disputes. An interesting question therefore is why 
the G2 on average – across all the disputes in which they have been complainants – make fewer 
claims than DEV and IND. 
 
Table 2: Distribution of number of legal claims by group pairing 
  Respondent  
 G2 IND DEV TOT 
G2 380 201 48 629 
IND 971 37 81 1089 













The claims by all three groups, but in particular by IND, are heavily skewed toward G2 as 
a respondent. While acting as a respondent in 61% of the bilateral disputes in the data set, they 
are the targets of 78% of all claims. The situation is the opposite for developing countries: they 
are respondents in 17% of the bilateral disputes, but only confront 9% of the claims. The role of 
G2 as a complainant against DEV is very modest compared with those of IND and DEV: G2 only 
accounts for 23% of the claims against DEV, while IND accounts for 38% and DEV for 39%.  
There are two rather different ways to view the burden imposed by the DS system on 
DEV. If judged from the point of view of the number of bilateral disputes in which they have to 
put up a legal defense, 17.4% of the bilateral disputes are directed at DEV. On the other hand, if 
the burden is measured by the number of legal claims that need to be refuted, 8.9% of all claims 
are against DEV. Table 3 provides another way to characterize activity with regard to legal 
claims. It depicts the average number of claims for each pair (complainant group, respondent 
group). There is significant variation, both for each complainant group across respondents, and 
for each respondent group across complainants. At the lower end, a G2 complaint against a DEV 
country on average involves 3.7 claims, while an IND complaint against a G2 country on average 












1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73 76
Number of claims in a bilateral dispute 
 7
comprises almost 28 claims. This pattern presumably reflects a complicated interaction between 
trade patterns, features of the various agreements under which the trade takes place, and all other 
factors going into the decision on legal strategy.  
Table 3: Average number of claims within each group pairing 
 Respondent 
 G2 IND DEV 
G2 19 9.14 3.7 








DEV 14.8 19.8 16.6 
 
3.3 The distribution of claims across provisions/agreements 
The majority of claims made in the disputes relate to the three contingent protection-related 
disciplines of the WTO: the agreements on antidumping (AD), subsidies and countervailing 
measures (SCM), and safeguards (SG) (Table 4; detailed information on the number of claims by 
WTO provision and country grouping is given in Appendices 2-5). This is not surprising given 
that in absolute terms the case-law on these three instruments constitute almost 25% of all 
disputes (Horn and Mavroidis, 2008b). In part this is simply a reflection of the significant 
increase in the use of these three instruments – see Table 5. The high share of SG claims is 
somewhat misleading in that they do not imply these types of cases have come to be an important 
share of all DS. The high number of claims instead reflects similar (identical) cases being brought 
by multiple WTO members. More specifically, the US steel safeguard cases alone (DS248-254, 
258-9) represent almost 80% of the total number of SG claims made. This compares to the 15% 
share of the US in the total number of safeguard actions imposed during the 1995-2005 period 
(Bown, 2006).7  
A similar point can be made in respect of disputes concerning the use of sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) measures. Of the 286 claims made in respect of the SPS agreement, over 
90% pertain to three related cases: the EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products 
disputes (DS 291/292/293). Another factor that may explain why the majority of claims occur for 
these three instruments is the fact that detailed procedural requirements are laid out for actions 
under each to be WTO-compliant. Many of these requirements are not expressed in precise 
                                                 
7 The US launched 10 safeguard investigations during this period. 
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language. For example, a number of AD disputes concern Art. 12, which calls for the 
investigating authorities to publish the essence of their findings. However, it does not spell out 
exactly what must be published.8 





































economy members 120 59 
1,687 1,126 
Developed economies 25 11 1,225 696 
 Source: Bown (2006). 
 
 
                                                 
8 While one may expect that if specific provisions have been interpreted in a consistent manner by panels/AB these 
should give rise to fewer disputes than for provisions where the case-law has not been uniform, this hypothesis 
remains to be tested. In practice it is not straightforward to identify a benchmark for establishing which provisions 
have been interpreted in a uniform manner, and which not. 
Provision/agreement No of 
claims 
Antidumping (AD) 615 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) 13 











Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) 269 
Safeguards (SG) 580 
Sanitary & Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) 285 




4.  A broad characterization of the distribution of outcomes 
We next turn to the reaction by panels to the 2,369 legal claims recorded in our data set. As 
described above, the outcomes are coded using three categories: win, loss or unclear.  Table 6 
gives the number of successful claims for each pair of complainant and respondent, as well as 
totals for the various categories.9  
Table 6: Total number of successful claims by group pairing 
  Respondent  
 G2 IND DEV TOT 
G2 237 127 43 407 
IND 538 35 41 614 








TOT 1,075 180 142 1,397 
 
Of interest here is the average number of successful claims. This can be calculated in 
different ways. One is to simply divide the total number of successful claims (“wins”) for a given 
group by the total number of claims made by the group for a specific pairing. Data on this 
measure are reported in Table 7. It is striking that when comparing the three groups’ overall 
success rates, they are remarkably similar: when acting as complainants, G2, IND and DEV win 
between 56% and 65% of the claims they advance, when calculated as a share of all the claims 
each group makes (Table 7). Similarly, the complainant on average wins 56-67% of all claims 
regardless of whether it is directed vis-à-vis G2, IND or DEV.  
 
Table 7: Share of successful claims, based on the sum of all claims by group pair (%) 
 
  Respondent  
 G2 IND DEV TOT 
G2 62.4 63.2 89.6 64.7 
IND 55.4 94.6 50.6 56.4 







TOT 58.4 56.8 67.0 59.0 
 
Although shares of successful claims are similar across many group pairs, Table 7 also 
reveals a significant variability across several complainant-respondent constellations. In 
                                                 
9 Detailed data by dispute is presented in Appendix 6. 
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particular, DEV countries have been much less successful against IND countries than they have 
been against the G2 or other DEV countries. However, the 22.8% success rate is to a significant 
degree explained by the large number of claims in DS 312 Korea – Certain Paper, where 
Indonesia acted as complainant. It thus, probably, suffers from selection bias. But DEV have also 
been less successful in two of the other three bilateral disputes they have had against IND. The 
other “outliers” in terms of success rates are IND against other IND countries and G2 versus 
DEV – in both instances registering around a 90% success rate. These numbers indicate that the 
cases brought were directed towards rather clear-cut violations of the relevant WTO disciplines.  
Table 8 provides an alternative picture of the average success rates of claims. In order to 
compile it, we first calculate the fraction of claims that are successful for each dispute, and then 
compute the average of these fractions. This method in a certain sense takes greater account of 
the variability across disputes of success rates.10 The picture emerging from Table 8 appears to be 
rather similar to the one provided by Table 7. Again, the overall success rates of the three groups 
when acting as complainants are comparable, while there are greater differences across the 
bilateral disputes where each of the three groups acted as a respondent. In particular, 66% of all 
disputes against G2 succeeded, while the corresponding number for disputes against DEV is 
75.5%. 
 
Table 8: Average percentage successful claims for by group pairings, based on success rates 
for each bilateral dispute  
 
  Respondent  
 G2 IND DEV TOT 
G2 68.7 70.8 94.1 77.9 
IND 53.9 95.6 72.7 74.1 







TOT 66.2 70 75.5 70.6 
 
A natural question is whether the number of claims that are made affects the success rate. 
For instance, it might be thought that a large number of claims reflects a careful examination of 
                                                 
10 To see the difference between the two methodologies, consider the following example. Let there be two disputes A 
and B for some complainant-respondent pairing. In A there was one claim, and it was accepted, and in B there were 
two claims, one of which was accepted. One view of this is to say for this pairing, there were a total of 3 claims and 
two of these where successful so the average success rate is 2/3 – this is how Table 6 is constructed. An alternative 
would be to do as in Table 7, and say that the success rate was 1 in dispute A and .5 in dispute B, so the average 
success rate is (1 + .5)/2 or 3/4.  
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the legal situations, or alternatively, careless litigation. Figure 2 provides some information on 
this. An alternative hypothesis is that a large number of claims will lead the courts to use judicial 
economy, or to not adjudicate for other reasons. Figure 3 shows evidence compatible with such 
an argument. As can be seen, there is a clear tendency that with larger number of claims, an 
increasing fraction is not being adjudicated. It is also noteworthy, however, that 119 out of the 
144 bilateral disputes, (over 80% of cases) record no instance of non-adjudication.  
Another relevant question is whether success rates vary across types of disputes. Table 9 
reports for each WTO agreement the number of claims that are won, lost, and unclear, as well as 
the percentage distribution for each type of outcome for claims under the agreement. Across 
WTO disciplines, the largest number of claims made in the DS system during 1995-2006 referred 
to the AD, GATT, SG, SPS, and SCM agreements (in declining order). The average “win rate” 
across all claims and agreements is 59%. Claims under AD have among the lowest win rates 
(30%), while win rates for claims under the SCM and SPS agreements are also below the 
average, at 44% and 51%. The SG is sui generis in that the US steel cases dominate this category 
– they account for 447 of the 580 SG claims (77%). Thus, of the agreements that have generated 
a large numbers of claims in the aggregate, only one – GATT – is generally associated with a 
high share of “wins” (68%).  What underlies this disparity requires further research – possible 
explanations are that GATT articles are well understood, with an extensive case law that predates 
the formation of the WTO, and that they are relatively broad and unambiguous to interpret (e.g., 
disciplines such as national treatment, tariff bindings, MFN). Whatever the reason, there appears 
to be less certainty/clarity for claimants and/or the panels when it comes to assessing claims 
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1 3 5 7 9 11 14 16 18 21 25 30 33 36 40 53 62 75
Number of claims in disputes 
% 
Unclear 
Figure 3: Average rate of non-adjudicated claims over all bilateral disputes 
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Table 9: Outcome of claims in bilateral disputes for various agreements 
Agreement Data Outcome Total 
    Win Lose Unclear   
AD Number of claims 183 329 103 615 
  Row percent 30 53 17 100 
ATC Number of claims 12 1 0 13 
  Row percent 92 8 0 100 
AA Number of claims 43 2 1 46 
  Row percent 93 4 2 100 
DSU Number of claims 9 4 3 16 
  Row percent 56 25 19 100 
Enabling Clause Number of claims 1 0 0 1 
  Row percent 100 0 0 100 
GATS Number of claims 23 5 2 30 
  Row percent 77 17 7 100 
GATT Number of claims 257 88 36 381 
  Row percent 68 23 9 100 
GPA Number of claims 0 1 0 1 
  Row percent 0 100 0 100 
Import Licensing  Number of claims 6 2 0 8 
  Row percent 75 25 0 100 
Rules of Origin Number of claims 0 8 0 8 
  Row percent 0 100 0 100 
Ref Paper(GATS) Number of claims 2 1 0 2 
  Row percent 67 33 0 100 
SCM Number of claims 118 112 39 269 
  Row percent 44 42 14 100 
SG Number of claims 560 14 6 580 
  Row percent 97 2 1 100 
SPS Number of claims 145 55 85 285 
  Row percent 51 19 30 100 
TBT Number of claims 1 2 11 14 
  Row percent 7 14 79 100 
TRIMs Number of claims 5 2 0 7 
  Row percent 71 29 0 100 
TRIPS Number of claims 17 30 14 61 
  Row percent 28 49 23 100 
WTO Number of claims 15 10 5 30 
  Row percent 50 33 17 100 
Total Number of claims 1398 666 305 2369 
  Row percent 59 28 13 100 
 
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
This paper has presented and discussed one dimension of a new, comprehensive dataset on WTO 
dispute settlement – the number of claims made in cases, and the extent to which they are 
accepted b panels. The data reveal that on the one hand there is very substantial variation across 
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types of disputes (the WTO agreements that are invoked) and types of countries – with lower 
income countries (DEV) tending to put forward a significantly greater number of claims than 
higher income WTO members. But the data on the other hand suggest that the rate of success in 
WTO DS cases – if measured by the share of claims “won” – is broadly similar across 
industrialized and developing countries, despite the differences in ‘capacity’ and ‘administrative 
sophistication’ that presumably exist across the groups, in particular DEV relative to IND and 
G2. This is somewhat counter-intuitive in that it goes against the literature, which places a lot of 
emphasis on the importance of embedded, institutional expertise as a factor that importantly 
influences the outcome in WTO litigation.  
While capacity constraints of various types certainly may constrain the use of the DS 
system – i.e., result in fewer cases being brought by DEV members – the data suggest that 
conditional on a case being brought that results in the formation of a DS panel, the success rate as 
measured by share of claims “won” is similar. As things stand, absent additional research on 
these questions, the data do not support the argument that the DEV group is disadvantaged 
because they cannot display expertise comparable to that of G2 and IND. Understanding the 
reasons for this finding requires further research, but may well reflect the fact that the countries in 
the DEV group that make most use of the DS system are generally either large or middle-income. 
Thus, the participation constraint for these countries may be much less than it is for lower-income 
countries. In addition, initiatives such as the Advisory Center on WTO Law (ACWL) should have 
helped to level the playing field with regard to access to legal expertise for smaller and poorer 
countries. 
An interesting question for which we know fewer potential explanations is why we 
observe such large differences in the number of claims across complainant-respondent groupings. 
The type of case/dispute clearly plays a role: AD, SCM and SPS all have high numbers of claims. 
All three agreements are rather technical and impose numerous disciplines that can – and do – 
give rise to violation claims. Understanding this dimension of the DS case load is a subject on 
which further research is needed, in particular the extent to which it can explain the large 
discrepancy in the average number of claims brought by countries with different levels of per 
capita incomes. Even if the number of claims brought is just one, perhaps minor, dimension of the 
DS system, we believe that additional analysis of the determinants of the pattern of claims 
revealed by the dataset could generate useful insights into the behavior/strategy of countries. 
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Possible hypotheses that could be explored in empirical analysis using the database include the 
following: 
(a) Is legal capacity not an issue, because panels are quite intrusive and can make up for 
deficient arguments? How effective has been the use of discovery powers by panels? 
(b) Is it the case that legal expertise is not that costly and/or readily available (e.g., as a result 
of the ACWL), and that even WTO Members with limited institutional expertise can 
easily outsource/obtain it? 
(c) Is it the case that the picture emerging from the claims data is, in a way, flawed, since 
WTO Members with very limited administrative expertise do not participate as 
complainants in the first place? The argument to explore here would be whether those 
participating in WTO panel adjudication share a minimum level of internal 
government/administrative expertise that is required for successful litigation. 
(d) Do the chances for a developing country to succeed with a claim depend on the identity 
of the respondent? 
(e) Do the chances for a developing country to succeed with a claim depend on the number 
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Appendix 1: Classification of WTO Members 
         
G2    Developing (DEV)   
EC     Albania  Kyrgyz Republic 
US     Antigua and Barbuda Macao - China 
     Argentina  Malaysia  
     Armenia  Mauritius  
LDCs     Bahrain  Moldova  
Angola    Barbados  Mongolia  
Bangladesh    Belize  Morocco  
Benin  Industrialized (IND)  Bolivia  Namibia  
Burkina Faso  Australia   Botswana  Nicaragua  
Burundi   Canada   Brazil  Nigeria  
Cambodia  Croatia   Brunei Darussalam Oman  
Central African Rep Hong Kong – China   Cameroon  Pakistan  
Chad   Iceland   Chile  Panama  
Dem. Rep. Congo Israel   China  Papua New Guinea 
Djibouti  Japan  Colombia  Paraguay  
Gambia  Korea   Congo  Peru  
Guinea  Liechtenstein   Costa Rica Philippines 
Guinea-Bissau Mexico   Côte d'Ivoire Qatar  
Haiti  New Zealand  Cuba  Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Lesotho   Norway   Dominica  Saint Lucia 
Madagascar Singapore   Dominican Republic Saint Vincent & the Grenadines 
Malawi   Switzerland   Ecuador  Saudi Arabia 
Maldives  Turkey   Egypt  South Africa 
Mali     El Salvador Sri Lanka  
Mauritania    Fiji  Suriname  
Mozambique   FYR Macedonia Swaziland  
Myanmar     Gabon  Chinese Taipei 
Nepal      Georgia  Tanzania  
Niger      Ghana  Thailand  
Rwanda      Grenada  Trinidad and Tobago 
Senegal     Guatemala Tunisia  
Sierra Leone    Guyana  United Arab Emirates 
Solomon Islands    Honduras  Uruguay  
Togo     India  Venezuela 
Uganda      Indonesia  Zimbabwe  
Zambia      Jamaica    
     Jordan    
     Kenya    
     Kuwait    
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Appendix 2: Detailed description of no of claims per provision 
 
Provision No. of 
claims 
Provision No. of 
claims 
Provision No. of 
claims 
      
AD:1 18 AD:4.1 4 ATC:6.2 3 
AD:10.1 2 AD:5.1 1 ATC:6.4 3 
AD:10.2 1 AD:5.2 3 ATC:6.6d 1 
AD:10.4 1 AD:5.3 6 AoA 1 
AD:10.6 2 AD:5.4 12 AoA:10.1 2 
AD:10.7 2 AD:5.5 4 AoA:3.1a 1 
AD:11 2 AD:5.6 2 AoA:3.1b 1 
AD:11.1 8 AD:5.7 1 AoA:3.2 4 
AD:11.2 7 AD:5.8 12 AoA:3.3 7 
AD:11.3 19 AD:6 1 AoA:4.2 4 
AD:12.1 4 AD:6.1 3 AoA:5.1b 1 
AD:12.1.1 1 AD:6.1.1 2 AoA:6 2 
AD:12.1.1iv 1 AD:6.1.2 4 AoA:7.2a 2 
AD:12.2 6 AD:6.1.3 1 AoA:8 8 
AD:12.2.2 4 AD:6.10 5 AoA:9.1a 7 
AD:12.3 2 AD:6.2 9 AoA:9.1c 5 
AD:15 14 AD:6.4 9 AoA:9.1d 1 
AD:17.6i 1 AD:6.5 2 DSU:21.5 1 
AD:18 1 AD:6.5.1 1 DSU:22.6 1 
AD:18.1 12 AD:6.6 2 DSU:23.1 4 
AD:18.3 2 AD:6.7 2 DSU:23.2a 4 
AD:18.4 23 AD:6.8 15 DSU:23.2b 1 
AD:2 5 AD:6.9 8 DSU:23.2c 4 
AD:2.1 6 AD:7.4 1 DSU:3.7 1 
AD:2.2 3 AD:8.3 10 EnC:2a 1 
AD:2.2.1 1 AD:9.1 2 GATS: Telecom Annex ,5a 2 
AD:2.2.1.1 1 AD:9.2 3 GATS: Telecom,55 2 
AD:2.2.2 4 AD:9.3 11 GATS:II 7 
AD:2.4 29 AD:9.4 1 GATS:V 2 
AD:2.4.1 4 AD:9.5 2 GATS:VI.1 1 
AD:2.4.2 16 AD:AnnI.2 1 GATS:VI.3 1 
AD:2.6 1 AD:AnnI.7 1 GATS:XI 1 
AD:3.1 32 AD:AnnII 4 GATS:XIV 1 
AD:3.2 21 AD:AnnII.1 1 GATS:XIV.a 1 
AD:3.3 7 AD:AnnII.3 4 GATS:XIV.c 1 
AD:3.4 24 AD:AnnII.5 2 GATS:XVI.1 1 
AD:3.5 22 AD:AnnII.6 7 GATS:XVI.2 1 
AD:3.6 2 AD:AnnII.7 4 GATS:XVII 9 
AD:3.7 4 ATC:2 1 GATT:6.1.3 1 
AD:3.7i 1 ATC:2.4 2 GATT:I 9 
AD:3.8 2 ATC:6 2 GATT:I.1 9 
AD:4 1 ATC:6.10 1 GATT:II 4  
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Appendix 2: Detailed description of no of claims per provision (cont’d) 
Provision No of claims Provision No of 
claims 
Provision No of 
claims 
      
GATT:II.1 3 GPA:XXII.2 1 SCM:21.1 5 
GATT:II.1(a) 1 Illustrative List (TRIMS) 1 SCM:21.2 1 
GATT:II.1(b) 2 ILA:1 1 SCM:21.3 7 
GATT:II.1a 4 ILA:1.2 5 SCM:22.3 1 
GATT:II.1b 9 ILA:1.4a 1 SCM:27.4 1 
GATT:III 2 ILA:3 1 SCM:28.2 4 
GATT:III.2 25 ROO:2b 3 SCM:3 1 
GATT:III.4 44 ROO:2c 3 SCM:3.1a 24 
GATT:III.8b 1 ROO:2d 2 SCM:3.1b 3 
GATT:VI 5 Reference Paper(1.1) 1 SCM:3.2 8 
GATT:VI.1 12 Reference Paper(2.2b) 2 SCM:32.1 19 
GATT:VI.2 26 SCM:1 4 SCM:32.5 14 
GATT:VI.3 17 SCM:1.1 3 SCM:4 1 
GATT:VI.4 2 SCM:1.1a 2 SCM:4.10 10 
GATT:VI.6a 1 SCM:1.1b 2 SCM:5c 2 
GATT:VIII 2 SCM:1.2 1 SCM:7 1 
GATT:X 1 SCM:10 16 SCM:7.9 10 
GATT:X.1 2 SCM:11.4 11 SCM:AnnI 1 
GATT:X.2 2 SCM:12 1 SG:11 1 
GATT:X.3 8 SCM:12.6 1 SG:12.1 2 
GATT:X.3a 33 SCM:14 10 SG:12.1a 1 
GATT:XI 9 SCM:14.d 2 SG:12.1b 1 
GATT:XI.1 8 SCM:14d 1 SG:12.1c 1 
GATT:XIII 2 SCM:15.1 1 SG:12.2 2 
GATT:XIII.1 6 SCM:15.2 3 SG:12.3 5 
GATT:XIII.2 1 SCM:15.4 2 SG:2 4 
GATT:XIII.2a 1 SCM:15.5 2 SG:2.1 192 
GATT:XIX 4 SCM:17.1b 1 SG:3 1 
GATT:XIX.1 52 SCM:17.2 1 SG:3.1 160 
GATT:XIX.1a 13 SCM:17.3 1 SG:3.2 1 
GATT:XV.9a 1 SCM:17.4 1 SG:4 5 
GATT:XVII.1 1 SCM:17.5 1 SG:4.1a 1 
GATT:XVII.1a 3 SCM:18.3 10 SG:4.1b 6 
GATT:XVII.1b 1 SCM:19 2 SG:4.1c 5 
GATT:XVIII.11 1 SCM:19.1 5 SG:4.2 74 
GATT:XVIII.B 1 SCM:19.4 12 SG:4.2a 8 
GATT:XX 6 SCM:2 3 SG:4.2b 74 
GATT:XX.b 3 SCM:2.1 1 SG:4.2c 3 
GATT:XX.d 14 SCM:2.1c 1 SG:5 3 
GATT:XX.g 2 SCM:2.4 1 SG:5.1 3 
GATT:XXIII.1b 2 SCM:20.6 2 SG:7.1 1 
GATT:XXIV 2 SCM:21 2 SG:8.1 2 
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Appendix 2: Detailed description of no of claims per provision (cont’d) 





SG:9.1 1 TRIPs:49 1 
SPS3.1 1 TRIPs:63.1 1 
SPS:2.2 5 TRIPs:63.2 1 
SPS:2.3 1 TRIPs:65.1 1 
SPS:3.1 1 TRIPs:70.8a 2 
SPS:3.3 2 TRIPs:70.9 2 
SPS:5.1 4 TRIPs:9.1 2 
SPS:5.5 3 WTO:XVI.4 30 
SPS:5.6 4   
SPS:5.7 2   
SPS:7 1   
SPS:AnnB.1 1   
TBT:2.1 1   
TBT:2.2 1   
TBT:2.4 1   
TRIMs:2 6   
TRIPS:13 2   
TRIPS:33 1   
TRIPS:70.1 1   
TRIPS:70.2 1   
TRIPs:1.1 1   
TRIPs:15.1 1   
TRIPs:16.1 4   
TRIPs:2.1 12   
TRIPs:20 1   
TRIPs:22.2 1   
TRIPs:24.5 1   
TRIPs:27.1 1   
TRIPs:28.1 2   
TRIPs:3 1   
TRIPs:3.1 6   
TRIPs:4 2   
TRIPs:41 2   
TRIPs:41.1 1   
TRIPs:41.2 1   
TRIPs:41.3 1   
TRIPs:42 3   
TRIPs:43 1   
TRIPs:44 1   
TRIPs:45 1   
TRIPs:46 1   
TRIPs:48 1   
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Appendix 5: Detailed description of number of claims by DEV per provision 
Provision 
 











































Appendix 6: The outcomes of claims made in the bilateral disputes 





























2 US – Gasoline Venezuela US 4 0 0 4 
4 US – Gasoline Brazil US 4 0 0 4 
8 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II EC Japan 2 0 0 2 
10 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II Canada Japan 2 0 0 2 
11 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II US Japan 2 0 0 2 
18 Australia - Salmon  Canada Australia 5 0 0 5 
22 Brazil – Desiccated Coconut Philippines Brazil 0 0 4 4 
24 US – Underwear Costa Rica US 6 0 0 6 
26 EC – Hormones (US) US EC 4 0 2 6 
27 EC – Bananas III Ecuador EC 7 0 0 7 
27 EC – Bananas III Guatemala EC III 0 0 7 
27 EC – Bananas III Honduras EC 7 0 0 7 
27 EC – Bananas III Mexico EC 7 0 0 7 
27 EC – Bananas III US EC 7 0 0 7 
31 Canada – Periodicals US Canada 4 1 0 5 
33 US – Wool Shirts and Blouses India  US 2 0 0 2 
34 Turkey – Textiles India Turkey 3 0 0 3 
44 Japan – Film US Japan 0 3 0 3 
46 Brazil – Aircraft  Canada Brazil 5 0 0 5 
48 EC – Hormones (Canada) Canada EC 4 0 2 6 
50 India – Patents (US) US India 4 0 0 4 
54 Indonesia – Autos EC Indonesia 4 1 0 5 
55 Indonesia – Autos Japan Indonesia 3 1 0 4 
56 Argentina – Textiles and Apparel US Argentina 2 0 0 2 
58 US – Shrimp India US 2 0 0 2 
58 US – Shrimp Malaysia US 2 0 0 2 
58 US – Shrimp Pakistan US 2 0 0 2 
58 US – Shrimp Thailand US 2 0 0 2 
59 Indonesia – Autos US Indonesia 3 4 0 7 
60 Guatemala – Cement I Mexico Guatemala 2 0 0 2 
62 EC – Computer Equipment US EC 1 0 0 1 
64 Indonesia – Autos Japan Indonesia 3 1 0 4 
67 EC – Computer Equipment US UK 1 0 0 1 
68 EC – Computer Equipment US Ireland 1 0 0 1 
69 EC – Poultry Brazil EC 2 6 0 8 
70 Canada – Aircraft  Brazil Canada 4 10 0 14
75 Korea – Alcoholic Beverages EC Korea 2 0 0 2 
76 Japan – Agricultural Products II US Japan 5 0 0 5 
79 India – Patents (EC) EC India 2 0 0 2 
84 Korea – Alcoholic Beverages US Korea 2 0 0 2 

































90 India – Quantitative Restrictions US India 4 0 0 4 
98 Korea – Dairy  EC Korea 3 6 0 9 
99 US – DRAMS  Korea US 1 0 0 1 
103 Canada – Dairy US Canada 6 0 0 6 
108 US – FSC EC US 4 0 1 5 
110 Chile – Alcoholic Beverages EC Chile 2 0 0 2 
113 Canada – Dairy New Zealand Canada 5 0 0 5 
114 Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents EC Canada 1 2 0 3 
121 Argentina – Footwear (EC) EC Argentina 2 0 0 2 
122 Thailand – H–Beams Poland Thailand 6 6 0 12
126 Australia – Automotive Leather II  US Australia 2 1 0 3 
132 Mexico – Corn Syrup US Mexico 10 5 0 15
135 EC – Asbestos Canada EC 1 2 0 3 
136 US – 1916 Act (EC) EC US 6 0 0 6 
138 US – Lead and Bismuth II EC US 1 0 0 1 
139 Canada – Autos Japan Canada 7 2 0 9 
141 EC – Bed Linen India EC 3 8 0 11
142 Canada – Autos EC Canada 7 2 0 9 
152 US – Section 301 Trade Act EC US 0 9 0 9 
155 Argentina – Hides and Leather EC  Argentina 5 0 0 5 
156 Guatemala – Cement II Mexico Guatemala 19 0 0 19
160 US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act EC US 2 2 0 4 
161 Korea – Various Measures on Beef US Korea 16 0 0 16
162 US – 1916 Act (Japan) Japan US 10 0 0 10
163 Korea – Procurement US Korea 0 1 0 1 
165 US – Certain EC Products EC US 12 0 0 12
166 US – Wheat Gluten EC US 8 3 3 14
169 Korea – Various Measures on Beef Australia Korea 16 0 0 16
170 Canada – Patent Term US Canada 3 0 0 3 
175 India – Autos US India 4 0 0 4 
176 US – Section 211 Appropriations Act EC US 2 13 0 15
177 US – Lamb New Zealand US 6 1 0 7 
178 US – Lamb Australia US 6 1 0 7 
179 US – Stainless Steel Korea US 4 6 0 10
184 US – Hot-Rolled Steel Japan US 7 22 0 29
189 Argentina – Ceramic Tiles EC Argentina 5 0 0 5 
192 US – Cotton Yarn Pakistan US 4 1 0 5 
194 US – Export Restraints Canada US 0 2 0 2 
202 US – Line Pipe Korea US 26 4 0 30
204 Mexico – Telecoms US Mexico 4 3 0 7 
206 US – Steel Plate India US 2 5 0 7 
207 Chile – Price Band System Argentina Chile 19 2 0 21
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211 Egypt – Steel Rebar Turkey Egypt 3 30 2 35
212 US –  Countervailing Measures EC US 25 0 0 25
213 US – Carbon Steel EC US 5 4 0 9 
217 US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) Australia US 9 6 0 15
217 US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) Brazil US 9 6 0 15
217 US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) Chile US 9 6 0 15
217 US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) EC US 9 6 0 15
217 US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) India US 9 6 0 15
217 US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) Indonesia US 9 6 0 15
217 US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) Japan US 9 6 0 15
217 US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) Korea US 9 6 0 15
217 US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) Thailand US 9 6 0 15
219 EC – Tube and Pipe Fittings Brazil EC 4 35 0 39
221 US - Section 129(c)(1) URAA Canada US 0 14 0 14
222 Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees Brazil Canada 3 7 0 10
231 EC – Sardines Peru EC 1 0 0 1 
234 US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) Canada US 9 6 0 15
236 US – Softwood Lumber III Canada US 11 5 7 23
238 Argentina – Preserved Peaches Chile Argentina 10 0 6 16
241 Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties Brazil Argentina 20 9 2 31
243 US –  Textiles Rules of Origin India US 0 8 0 8 
244 US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review Japan US 0 37 3 40
245 Japan – Apples US Japan 3 0 0 3 
246 EC – Tariff Preferences India EC 3 0 0 3 
248 US –  Steel Safeguards  EC US 75 0 0 75
249 US –  Steel Safeguards  Japan  US 57 0 0 57
251 US –  Steel Safeguards  Korea US 57 0 0 57
252 US –  Steel Safeguards  China US 77 0 0 77
253 US –  Steel Safeguards  Switzerland US 77 0 0 77
254 US –  Steel Safeguards  Norway US 77 0 0 77
257 US – Softwood Lumber IV Canada US 7 13 11 31
258 US –  Steel Safeguards  New Zealand US 77 0 0 77
259 US –  Steel Safeguards  Brazil US 53 0 0 53
265 EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar Australia EC 4 0 0 4 
266 EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar Brazil EC 4 0 0 4 
267 US – Upland Cotton Brazil US 12 2 0 14
269 EC – Chicken Cuts Brazil EC 2 0 0 2 
276 Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports US Canada 11 7 0 18
282 US – AD Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods Mexico US 2 14 17 33
283 EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar Thailand EC 4 0 0 4 
285 US – Gambling Services Antigua and Barbuda US 5 2 2 9 
286 EC – Chicken Cuts Thailand EC 2 0 0 2 
290 EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications Australia EC 6 14 16 36
294 US – Zeroing EC US 3 40 22 65
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296 US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMs Korea US 3 8 12 23
301 EC – Commercial Vessels Korea EC 2 2 5 9 
302 
Dominican Republic – Import and Sale  of 
Cigarettes Honduras 
Dominican 
Republic 9 2 0 11
308 Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks US Mexico 6 0 0 6 
312 Korea — Certain Paper  Indonesia Korea 8 28 16 52
315 EC — Selected Customs Matters  US EC 2 15 0 17
322 US — Zeroing Japan US 2 40 20 62
 
 27
Appendix 7: Percentage win and total number of claims by complainant-respondent pair 


















































































Antigua and                  56 56
Barbuda                 9 9
Argentina     90             90
      21             21
Australia       58      100    73 72
        40      16    22 78
Brazil 65   29   59          86 64
  31   24   53          86 194
Canada  100 100    50     100     26 53
   5 5    9     2     85 106
Chile 63                60 61
  16                15 31
China                 100 100
                  77 77
Costa Rica                 100 100
                  6 6
EC 100   56 100     100 80 100 67    63 74
  12   12 4     2 5 2 11    255 303
Ecuador       100           100
        7           7
Guatemala       100           100
        7           7
Honduras      82 100           91
       11 7           18
India       64         100 58 64
        14         3 34 51
Indonesia             15    60 38
              52    15 67
Japan    78       75      48 57
     9       9      213 231
Korea       22          67 60
        9          136 145
Malaysia                 100 100
                  2 2
Mexico       100  100        6 77
        7  21        33 61
New Zealand    100             93 95
     5             84 89
Norway                 100 100
                  77 77
Pakistan                 90 90
                  7 7
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Appendix 7: Percentage win and total number of claims by complainant-respondent pair 
(cont’d) 
 


















































































Peru       100           100
        1           1
Philippines   0               0
    4               4
Poland               50   50
                12   12
Switzerland                 100 100
                  77 77
Thailand       100          80 90
        6          17 23
Turkey        9          9
         35          35
US 100 67  85   80   100 43 75 67 75    79
  2 3  32   33   12 7 13 19 28    149
Venezuela                 100 100
                  4 4
Average % win 88 83 50 69 97 82 74 9 100 100 68 83 64 75 50 100 65 71
Total no of claims 61 8 9 82 25 11 193 35 21 14 21 17 98 28 12 3 1254 1892
